Tucídides, historiador-filósofo: la manera de vivir del historiador by Christodoulou, Panos
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 19, nº 37. Primer semestre de 2017. 
Pp. 151-167.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2017.i37.07
Thucydides Philosophistoricus:            
The Way of Life of the Historian
Tucídides, historiador-filósofo: la manera de 
vivir del historiador
Panos Christodoulou1




Although Thucydides does not shed light on the reasons and the historical 
facts relating to his departure from Athens, he is certainly far clearer on the 
effects that this event had on his work. He explicitly recognizes that the 
condition of exile offered him the rather unique possibility to observe the 
conflict from the Peloponnesian side as well and to follow the course of events 
without being distracted by troubles or other activities (καθ’ ἡσυχίαν). In this 
study I emit the hypothesis that in 5.26 Thucydides makes an indirect allusion 
to the fact that a life of quietude, which liberates the eminent thinker from 
engagement in political life, is the path leading to intellectual production. This 
reading can help us recognize the intellectual affinities between Thucydides and 
the Athenian thinkers of the end of the fifth century BC and more particularly 
with Socrates’s circle.  
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Resumen
Aunque Tucídides no arroja luz sobre las razones ni sobre los hechos 
históricos relativos a su salida de Atenas, sí es de lejos más preciso acerca 
de las consecuencias que tal acontecimiento tuvo sobre  su obra. Reconoce 
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explícitamente que su condición de exiliado le ofreció la posibilidad más 
bien única de observar el conflicto desde el lado peloponesio, como también 
la de seguir el curso de los acontecimientos sin que los problemas u otras 
ocupaciones (καθ’ ἡσυχίαν) le distrajesen. En el presente estudio propongo 
la hipótesis de que en 5.26 Tucídides alude indirectamente al hecho de que 
una vida tranquila, que libera al eminente pensador de todo compromiso con 
la vida política, constituye la vía que lleva hacia la producción intelectual. 
Tal lectura permite ayudarnos a reconocer las afinidades intelectuales entre 
Tucídides y los pensadores atenienses de finales del siglo V antes de nuestra 
era, y en especial con las del círculo socrático.
Palabras-clave: exilio, intelectual, tranquilidad, filósofos, Pericles.
‘‘I lived through the whole of the war, studying it with mature perception 
and in the intellectual pursuit of an accurate understanding of events. The fact 
that I was in exile from my own country for twenty years after my command 
against Amphipolis gave me the opportunity to observe affairs on both sides, no 
less on that of the Peloponnesians, and to reflect on them with no distraction’’2.
This passage which probably constitutes the only incontrovertible fact 
in Thucydides’s biography3, has been much discussed. With the exception 
of Luciano Canfora who argued that Thucydides was back in Athens by 411 
BC the great majority of commentators accepts the fact that the writer of the 
Peloponnesian War returned to Athens after the end of the war4. Although 
Thucydides does not shed light on the reasons and the historical facts relating to 
his exile (φυγή)5 he is certainly far clearer on the effects that this event had on 
his work6. He explicitly recognizes that the condition of exile offered him the 
rather exceptional occasion to observe the conflict from the Peloponnesian side 
as well and to follow the course of events without being distracted by troubles 
2  Thuc. 5.26.5: ‘‘ἐπεβίων δὲ διὰ παντὸς αὐτοῦ αἰσθανόμενός τε τῇ ἡλικίᾳ καὶ προσέχων τὴν γνώμην, 
ὅπως ἀκριβές τι εἴσομαι· καὶ ξυνέβη μοι φεύγειν τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ ἔτη εἴκοσι μετὰ τὴν  ἐς Ἀμφίπολιν 
στρατηγίαν, καὶ γενομένῳ παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ οὐχ ἧσσον τοῖς Πελοποννησίων διὰ 
τὴν  φυγήν, καθ’ ἡσυχίαν τι αὐτῶν μᾶλλον αἰσθέσθαι’’. On the so-called ‘‘second preface’’ and the 
methodology of Thucydides see Schepens 1980: 168-197. 
3  Canfora 2006: 11. 
4  See Canfora 2006. Debidour 2008 follows Canfora and believes that Thucydides was in Athens 
in 411 B.C., a hypothesis which seems quite improbable.    
5  On the ancient terminology see Gaertner 2007: 2: ‘‘the English word “exile” is far more precise 
than the corresponding Greek and Latin terms. Whereas the modern derivatives of the Latin word 
exilium imply an involuntary departure, sanctioned by political or judicial authorities, the ancient 
usage of the corresponding terms φυγή, fuga, exilium, and their derivatives is less strict. φυγὴ and 
φεύγειν cover both the expulsion of groups or individuals and their voluntary departure’’. 
6  On the figure of the exiled historian in antiquity see Payen 2010 and especially the fine analysis 
of Dillery 2007.
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or other activities (καθ’ ἡσυχίαν)’’7. As far as I know little attention has been 
given to the word ἡσυχία in this passage. 
It is worth pointing out that from the end of the fifth century words such 
as ἡσυχία, σχολή, ἀπραγμοσύνη, were explicitly linked with the ideal of vita 
contemplativa and more precisely with the individual who is exclusively 
devoted to the act of writing a political, philosophical text8. In what follows I 
would like to consider the hypothesis that in 5.26 Thucydides does not present 
his exile ‘‘strictly form a methodological view, as offering an advantageous 
situation and providing him with the “leisure” to observe affairs more closely’’9. 
The historian makes also an indirect allusion to the fact that a life of quietude, 
which liberates the eminent thinker from engagement in political life, is the 
path leading to intellectual production. I hope to show that this reading can help 
us recognize the intellectual affinities between Thucydides and the Athenian 
thinkers of the end of the fifth century BC and more particularly with Socrates’s 
circle.  
‘‘To those who no longer have a homeland, writing becomes home’’10
By the end of the archaic period the term ἡσυχία was linked with the 
aristocratic ideal of leisure and tranquility which involved spending time in 
political life and especially on activities such as hunting and the symposia11. In 
the classical period, Herodotus suggests that ἡσυχία is sometimes a prerequisite 
for the deployment of rational thought12, and in Thucydides, were the the verb 
ἡσυχάζειν appears quite often, mostly denotes military inactivity or the state of 
‘‘neutrality’’13. 
However, the writer of the Peloponnesian War is probably the first thinker 
to develop rather systematically the idea that ‘‘tranquillity’’ allows us to deal 
more effectively with the stressful reality surrounding us. When he was under 
the pressure of the over-eager Athenians who wanted to sail immediately to 
Sicily, Nicias said that ‘‘he would prefer to deliberate with his colleagues 
without distraction (ὁ δὲ ἄκων μὲν εἶπεν ὅτι καὶ μετὰ τῶν ξυναρχόντων καθ’ 
7  I adopt here the suggestion of Gomme 1970 on 5.26.5, who translates καθ’ ἡσυχίαν ‘‘Not 
distracted by troubles or other activities’’. 
8  Demont 1990: 16-17, 279-282. 
9  Schepens 2007: 48. 
10  Adorno 1974: 51. 
11  On the aristocratic ideal of leisure see Demont 1990: 53-85, and especially Han Van Wees 2009.
12  See Demont 1990: 181-182 with examples. 
13  See the examples given by Huart 1968: 368-369. Also as Zumbrunnen 2008: 36 convincingly 
argued ‘‘the keeping quiet that hesychia marks in fact does not amount to simple silence. It is more 
properly understood as a mode of action through inaction, one that often appears on the battlefield, 
either through the designs of commanders or through the force of circumstances’’. 
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ἡσυχίαν μᾶλλον βουλεύσοιτο)’’14 and Phrynichus insisted that the decision to 
avoid a battle which seems unnecessary is not a sign of cowardice, because 
it is better to earn time and without distraction to be fully prepared for the 
clash (καὶ καθ’ ἡσυχίαν παρασκευασαμένοις ἔσται ἀγωνίσασθαι, οὐδέποτε τῷ 
αἰσχρῷ ὀνείδει εἴξας ἀλόγως διακινδυνεύσειν)15. Of similar significance is the 
passage where the Melians responded to the Athenians that ‘‘the fairness of 
the proposal, that we shall at our leisure instruct one another (ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια 
τοῦ διδάσκειν καθ’ ἡσυχίαν ἀλλήλους), is not open to objection (οὐ ψέγεται), 
but these acts of war, which are not in the future, but already here at hand, are 
manifestly at variance with your suggestion’’16. In other words, the delegates 
of Melos argue that we can instruct each other when we are not distracted by 
the war, when we have the opportunity to develop rational and well elaborated 
ideas, something that is impossible for the moment because we are in the ‘‘eye 
of the storm’’ of the greatest movement (μεγίστη κίνησις)17.  
It comes as no surprise then that Thucydides deliberately insists that he was 
given the opportunity to observe without distraction the course of events only 
after having left the theatre of the war. In that context, the so called ‘‘second 
preface’’ is masterfully placed in this stage of the narrative. The historian 
indirectly illustrates the fact that his political activity, the devastating plague 
which afflicted Athens and of which he was not only an observer but also a 
victim18, his engagement in military activities as strategos, and more generally 
his devotion to public affairs19 deprived him of rest and tranquillity, which are 
absolutely necessary for a full understanding of the causes and certainly the 
real dimensions of the war. 
Although the exile of ancient historians and especially that of Thucydides 
has attracted its fair share of scholarly analysis, little attention has been paid 
to the notion of ‘‘inner exile’’ and more precisely that of ‘‘self-imposed exile’’, 
which I think can be applied in the case of the historian of the Peloponnesian 
War. Many literary critics recognize the category ‘‘inner exile’’ or ‘‘self-imposed 
exile’’ as a way of describing the alienation of a writer or artist from his native 
community or more generally from the community where he is living20.
14  Thucydides 6.25.2. Rogkotis 2006: 60 was perfectly right to stress the fact that in this scene 
Thucydides makes use of the so called ‘‘wise-adviser’’ or tragic ‘‘warner motif’’.  
15  Thuc. 8.27.2. In this case Thucydides praises Phrynichus’s intelligence. See Andrewes 1981 on 
8.27.5. On Phrynichus see Heftner 2005.   
16  Thuc. 5.86.
17  Thuc. 1.1.2. 
18  Thuc. 2.48.3. 
19  Rhodes 2006: 523: “He [Thucydides] was undoubtedly an engaged Athenian’’.   
20  See Tabori 1972: 31-32; Tucker 1991: xiii-ix; Said 2000: 137-149. For the different categories 
of exile in Ancient Greece see Wolf 2008 and especially Forsdyke 2005 with important bibliography. 
Forsdyke 2005: 144-2-4, uses also the term ‘‘inner exile’’ in order to describe the Athenian demos 
during the oligarchic revolution. For the exiled writers in Ancient Greece see Gaertner 2007. 
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Lucian’s famous passage on the characteristics of the excellent historian is a 
forcible reminder that this kind of exile is not a mere contemporary construction. 
According to the author ‘‘… the writer must be fearless, incorruptible, free, a 
friend of free expression and the truth, … well-disposed to all men up to the 
point of not giving one side more than its due, in his books a stranger and a man 
without a country, independent, subject to no sovereign (ξένος ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις 
καὶ ἄπολις, αὐτόνομος, ἀβασίλευτος,), not reckoning what this or that man will 
think, but stating the facts. Thucydides laid down this law very well…’’21. 
For Lucian it is impossible to envision the historian as a professor or a 
writer, as a pure theoretician whose authority derives directly from his excellent 
knowledge and use of a corpus of epistemological doctrines which can be 
considered as indispensable in order to narrate historical events in a masterly 
way. We must not forget that during Antiquity philosophy and more generally 
intellectual activity was never conceived as a systematic study of theoretical 
approaches and dogmatic accounts concerning life and human nature, but, as 
Pierre Hadot brilliantly showed, it was a way of life22. This is exactly what 
Lucian argues in this remarkable passage. Being a historian is an art of living23. 
The terms ἄφοβος, ἀδέκαστος, ἐλεύθερος, παρρησίας καὶ ἀληθείας φίλος, 
ἄπολις, αὐτόνομος, ἀβασίλευτος, denote a man who is free from political, civic 
or even social restrictions and obligations and who adopts a specific way of life 
which permits him to preserve and protect his intellectual freedom and thus 
become an excellent historian. Apparently in his eyes Thucydides embodied 
this ideal more than any other writer and I think his approach contains a kernel 
of truth. 
It is not unreasonable to support that Thucydides gives a new content to the 
term ἡσυχία. In 5.26 tranquility is explicitly connected to a specific intellectual 
activity: reflection and undivided devotion to a major subject. The presentation 
of the greatest of the wars in written form24, is extremely relevant to the very fact 
that Thucydides was no more bound by civic obligations. He was without city, 
free from the sovereignty of the demos, master of his own destiny, independent, 
free to state the facts as they were. His identification as an Athenian a few 
lines before the ‘‘second preface’’ is significant25. Thucydides the Athenian 
21  Luc., Hist. Conscr. 41: ‘‘Τοιοῦτος οὖν μοι ὁ συγγραφεὺς ἔστω – ἄφοβος, ἀδέκαστος, ἐλεύθερος, 
παρρησίας καὶ ἀληθείας φίλος, ὡς ὁ κωμικός φησι, τὰ σῦκα σῦκα, τὴν σκάφην δὲ σκάφην ὀνομάσων, 
οὐ μίσει οὐδὲ φιλίᾳ τι νέμων οὐδὲ φειδόμενος ἢ ἐλεῶν ἢ αἰσχυνόμενος ἢ δυσωπούμενος, ἴσος 
δικαστής, εὔνους ἅπασιν ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ θατέρῳ τι ἀπονεῖμαι πλεῖον τοῦ δέοντος, ξένος ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις 
καὶ ἄπολις, αὐτόνομος, ἀβασίλευτος, οὐ τί τῷδε ἢ τῷδε δόξει λογιζόμενος, ἀλλὰ τί πέπρακται λέγων’’. 
On Lucian and his relation to Thucydides’s text see the recent study of Tamiolaki 2015. 
22  For this term in ancient Greek philosophy see Hadot 1995. 
23  We cannot analyse here the personality of Lucian and his place in Ancient literature. However, 
it is important to remember the profoundly philosophical aspect of his thought. See Longo 1964; 
Mestre 2012/13. 
24  Thuc. 1.21.2. 
25  Thuc. 5.26.1: Γέγραφε δὲ καὶ ταῦτα ὁ αὐτὸς Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος. He probably aims to present 
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transformed his personal misfortune –the painful physical separation from 
his homeland where he had served as an active citizen– to a great intellectual 
achievement, something that apparently demands an inner transformation.
A complex question arises here: did exile make Thucydides a historian? 
This complicated issue exceeds the subject of the present article; I will however 
risk an outline of the answer that seems to me the correct one. Exile did non-
make Thucydides a historian. What made him a writer was his conscious 
decision to adopt a new, radically different way of life, which provided him 
with the necessary conditions to attain higher contemplative pursuits26. In 5.26 
tranquillity is not an abstract notion or an aristocratic privilege, but a way of 
living, in the same way as is for his fellow citizens the unstoppable movement 
(kinesis), because they ‘‘have been born to allow quiet (ἡσυχίαν) neither to 
themselves nor to others”27. This is the ethos of the Athenians and this was also 
his own. There came a moment when he realised that in order to comprehend 
and write down the complexity of human nature and society, the intellectual 
must stand on a ‘‘no man’s land’’. What is remarkable in 5.26 is that the author 
of the Peloponnesian War informs his reader that the man who is describing for 
the present and future generations the ‘‘greatest movement’’ is actually a man 
who manages to transform his unstoppable kinesis in the field of battle or in the 
Athenian political arena into an unstoppable intellectual kinesis. 
In that context, if exile was not Thucydides’ choice, the full and 
unconditional dedication to the composition of a written text that will be an 
everlasting possession, certainly was. Neither Themistokles, nor Cimon or 
Alcibiades –to mention but these prominent Athenians generals– made their 
banishment from Athens an occasion for change, an occasion to live in ‘‘quiet’’ 
and write down a great event. In other words, Thucydides’s decision reflects the 
intellectual orientation of his personality, his ability to transform his insightful 
observation of human nature into a written monument.   
Thucydides did not return to Athens until an amnesty was proclaimed in 
404 BC. There is no doubt that a part of the Peloponnesian War was written 
during the years of his homecoming, when an extensive revision of his text 
began. Internal evidences indicate that some passages where written after the 
end of the war and it is beyond any doubt that the methodological preface 
himself as the only one among his fellow citizens who can express freely his opinion about the war. 
It is important here to remark that parrhèsia, which according to Lucian is one of the virtues that 
the ideal historian must possess, is essentially philosophical. See the excellent comment of Visa-
Ondarçuhu 2006: 276: ‘‘Les personnages auxquels Lucien attribue l’aptitude à la παρρησία sont 
essentiellement des philosophes’’. 
26  Dillery 2007, rightly argues that indeed exile did not make Thucydides a historian. He was already 
one at the outbreak of the War (Thuc. 1.1.1). Although Thucydides very clearly states that he started writing 
down the war from its very beginning, he admits however that it is just after the exile that he acquired 
extensive information from his own inquiry. It is after his departure from Athens that he formulated the idea 
that direct inquiry is the most reliable means for writing history. See Schepens 2007: 48. 
27  Thuc. 1.70.8. 
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5.26 was demonstrably composed after the fall of his native city28. We can 
then assume that Thucydides’s fundamental ideological and methodological 
observations and statements about the benefits of thinking and writing without 
being ‘‘distracted by troubles or other activities’’ were perfectly crystalized 
when he returned to Athens. By then he was able to conceive his text in its 
entirety and to fully appreciate the particular conditions which helped him to 
perfect his methodology. 
In light of these observations I would like to suggest that Thucydides’s 
elaborate idea that the best way to accomplish his intellectual achievement was 
to retire from political life would profoundly mark the Athenian philosophers 
of the fourth century BC., and more precisely the disciples of Socrates and 
those influenced by his personality and teaching29. I am referring here to 
Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon, who form the most interesting and the most 
identifiable intellectual field in classical Athens.  
Thucydides’s impact on the philosophes of the 4th century BC
Recent studies reveal the fact that we can no longer place Thucydides 
in a single intellectual trend30. During the classical period history was not 
considered to be an autonomous and distinct discipline31. Those to whom we 
refer as ‘‘historians’’ in the 5th and 4th centuries BC were not only insightful 
observes of historical events; they were also thinkers who were positively 
influenced by contemporary debates on politics and science32. Thucydides’s 
interpretation of the ‘‘greatest of the wars’’, is based on theoretical assumptions 
that were current in his time, ‘‘and on ideas developed by philosophers, sophists 
and medical writers’’33. His text constituted, amongst other things, an attempt 
to comprehend the complexity of human nature and the socio-political ethos 
of his contemporary societies. Through the narration of the words, actions and 
deeds of contemporary political groups and individuals Thucydides offered to 
his readers the possibility to acquire complex, rational and scientific political 
knowledge. From this point of view the philosophers of the 4th century BC who 
were deeply interested in political history, were certainly engaged in dialogue 
with several aspects of the Peloponnesian War. We can imagine that in their 
eyes Thucydides was an eminent writer who developed a rather exceptional 
political discourse. 
28  See Hornblower 2008: 50-53.  
29  We can include Isocrates among those who were influenced by Socrates’s personality. See 
Demont 2011. 
30  See Bertelli 1993: 69; Raaflaub 2002: 186. See also the very useful comments by Thomas 2006.
31  Bouvier 1997: 49; Hartog 1999: 18 –19.  
32  See Tsakmakis 2016. 
33  Raaflaub 2002: 150.  
158 Panos Christodoulou
Araucaria. Revista Iberoamericana de Filosofía, Política y Humanidades, año 19, nº 37. Primer semestre de 2017. 
Pp. 151-167.   ISSN 1575-6823   e-ISSN 2340-2199   doi: 10.12795/araucaria.2017.i37.07
In the fifth century BC ‘‘what counted as wisdom was an extraordinarily 
open-ended and negotiable question. Anyone could set himself up as a 
philosopher or as a sophist or, come to that, as a doctor’’34. In that context, 
differentiation of intellectual categories is problematic when applied to 
Thucydides’s contemporaries. Greek intellectual activity is the history of 
polemic between those who claim the title of “wise” and “philosopher”35. Their 
fascinating effort to appropriate a specific prose genre (dialogues, political 
discourses, historical narratives, historical fictions, epideictic rhetoric etc.) in 
order to put forward their own world view, as well as their own political ideas 
derives, essentially, from a strategy of distinction36. More precisely, if indeed 
‘‘Thucydides might have been surprised or annoyed if his contemporaries 
called him a historian’’37, the same goes for Xenophon38 but also for Isocrates, 
who presented himself as a philosopher and his teaching as philosophy and 
certainly ‘‘might have been surprised or annoyed if his contemporaries called 
him orator’’39. 
I am not suggesting of course that the author of the Peloponnesian War was 
a ‘‘member’’ of Socrates’s intellectual circle nor that he was a ‘‘philosopher’’. 
We have to remember however that the term philosophein and its cognates were 
never used systematically before the fourth century BC and when it was used 
designated ‘‘intellectual cultivation’’. If Thucydides suggests that all Athenians 
were virtually practicing philosophy it is because the term does not point to any 
specific group of thinkers. In fact, a special subgroup of intellectuals that had 
appropriated the title ‘‘philosophoi’’ never existed in Athens before Plato and 
Isocrates40. 
Actually, they were the first –with Xenophon of course– to use the term 
philosophy in order to denote and legitimize a new and unique intellectual 
practice41. However, for these thinkers, philosophy is not just a mode of 
discourse or a corpus of doctrines but ‘‘a way of living and thinking’’ identified 
with the exclusive and unconditional devotion to the art of writing down and 
communicating their own ‘‘wisdom’’.   
34  Lloyd 1997: 103. 
35  On the polemic character of ancient Greek philosophy see Brunschwig 2003; Azoulay 2009. 
36  See further Engels 1998: 57; Christodoulou (forthcoming).  
37   Tsakmakis and Tamiolaki 2013: ix. 
38  Brisson, Dorion 2004, 138: ‘‘le Socrate des Mémorables est un philosophe et Xénophon lui-
même fait également œuvre de philosophe en exposant, dans une œuvre à la fois riche et complexe, 
les multiples facettes de l’inépuisable utilité de Socrate. Enfin, il faut s’interroger sur le fait que la 
reproche suivant laquelle Xénophon n’est pas un philosophe n’avait jamais été formulée, semble-t-
il, avant le début du XIXe siècle’’. It comes then as no surprise the fact that Diogenes Laertes 2.2. 
presents Xenophon as the first philosopher who wrote history (ἀλλὰ καὶ ἱστορίαν φιλοσόφων πρῶτος 
ἔγραψε).  
39  There is no need to further develop this point. See Eucken 1983; Nightingale 1995; Livingstone 
2007; Azoulay 2009; Demont 2008; 2011; Christodoulou 2012; Christodoulou (forthcoming). 
40  See Malingrey 1961.  
41  See the useful comments of Nightingale 1995: 12-15. 
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After the death of Socrates, Plato retired from political life and devoted 
himself to philosophy and writing. The foundation of the Academy (c. 387 
BC) constitutes an innovative act which aimed to provide the philosopher with 
the opportunity to elaborate without distraction his political and philosophical 
ideas. It can also be seen as voluntary ‘‘exile’’42. In an important passage of 
Anabasis Xenophon refers to his own exile43. Although he does not mention the 
reasons for his departure from Athens, he has more to say about what his life 
was during his deracination. For some years, he exercised military leadership 
and followed the campaigns of Cyrus the Young and of Agesilaus in Asia Minor. 
It seems however that after his establishment in Peloponnese (c.390)44, 
Xenophon retreated from political and military active life. As Dillery observed 
‘‘Xenophon finds a new identity in exile, as the patron and sole official of a new 
community he has founded’’45. For around twenty years46, he apparently enjoyed 
the fruits of a peaceful, quite life, dedicated to noble activities and certainly to 
the most precious: The transformation of his experiences, his reflections, his 
political and philosophical ideas into written texts. Xenophon was a prolific 
writer and even though it is not an easy task to date his intellectual production, it 
is very probable that he composed part of his works after his return to Athens47, 
where we can imagine that he continued to observe as an ‘‘outsider’’ the words 
and acts of his fellow citizens, and more generally of the Greeks.   
Isocrates who founded his philosophical school around 390 B.C.48 associated 
his intellectual activity with the composition of political discourses addressed 
to a reader audience49. According to his own words, after withdrawing from 
political life (τοῦ πολιτεύεσθαι διήμαρτον) he took refuge in philosophy (ἐπὶ τὸ 
φιλοσοφεῖν), and in writing down his thoughts (καὶ γράφειν ἃ διανοηθείην)50. 
The word κατέφυγον reveals the very fact that he chose to be in a condition of 
self-imposed exile, because he loved peace and tranquillity (τὴν μὲν ἡσυχίαν 
καὶ τὴν ἀπραγμοσύνην ἀγαπῶν)51, and the men who love tranquillity are ‘‘the 
most unofficious and the most peaceable of all men who live in Athens (ἀλλ’ 
ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ πλείστην ἡσυχίαν ἄγοντας), 
42  See the excellent comments of Vegetti 2004. Also Azoulay 2007, with references to passages 
from Plato’s work and especially Letter VII.  
43  Xen., An. 5.3.7: ‘‘ἐπειδὴ δ’ ἔφευγεν ὁ Ξενοφῶν, κατοικοῦντος ἤδη αὐτοῦ ἐν Σκιλλοῦντι ὑπὸ τῶν 
Λακεδαιμονίων οἰκισθέντος παρὰ τὴν Ὀλυμπίαν […]’’. We can date Xenophon’s exile around 395/4 
BC. For a full account of this matter see Tuplin 1987. 
44  See Azoulay 2004: 13 with bibliography. 
45  Dillery 2007: 67.  
46  Xenophon was probably forced to leave Scillus after Sparta’s defeat at Leuctra (371 BC). 
47  This is also a much-debated subject. See Badian 2004 who I think rightly argued that Xenophon 
returned to Athens where he spent his last years.   
48  See Engels 2003. 
49  Too 1995. 
50  Isoc., Panath. 11. 
51  Isoc., Antid. 151. 
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giving their minds to their own affairs and confining their intercourse to each 
other (προσέχοντας δὲ τὸν νοῦν σφίσιν αὐτοῖς καὶ τὰς συνουσίας μετ’ ἀλλήλων 
ποιουμένους)’’52. This a remarkable passage. Isocrates’s self-portrait is precisely 
that of a man who is not physically separated from his own country but is living 
in a condition of a self-imposed exile devoted to his intellectual production.
A great number of Athenian thinkers did not follow this path. Tragic and 
comedic poets, writers of forensic speeches, were present in the public sphere; 
they participated in the cultural and political life of their city, and never ceased 
to communicate to the Athenian demos aspects of their intellectual production53. 
This was not the case of thinkers such as Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon. 
Disappointed by the tragic failures of the Athenian aristocrats to improve 
the Athenian politeia and after the execution of Socrates by the demos, they 
made the revolutionary decision on the one hand, to withdraw from political 
life, and on the other hand, not to engage in dialogue with the majority of their 
fellow citizens54. They never addressed the Athenian demos who profoundly 
ignored their theoretical, philosophical reflections. Thus, contrary to the 
traditional ‘‘intellectuals’’ and political leaders who subordinated their thought 
to action, being essentially judged on the results of their active engagement in 
political and public life, they elaborated the rather unique idea that it is much 
preferable to exercise politics through the force of thought and writing55. 
Written after Thucydides’s return to Athens, the so-called second 
preface could be seen as the statement of an eminent ‘‘member’’ of this 
small, highly educated community of thinkers who proclaimed their radically 
and unconditional ‘‘autonomisation’’ from the civic institutions. There is 
no question about the difficulty of speaking of a Thucydidean ‘‘intellectual 
milieu’’56, but the very fact that Xenophon, Plato and Isocrates were extremely 
familiar with his oeuvre and his thought, could strengthen the hypothesis that 
the intellectual affinities between Thucydides’s and Socrates’s circle were more 
substantial than we may believe57. In particular, I suspect that the author of the 
Peloponnesian War was considered by the subsequent generation of Athenian 
thinkers as indeed one of the very first Athenian intellectuals to have adopted a 
‘‘philosophical way of life’’ related to the activity of contemplating and writing.
52  Isoc., Antid. 227. 
53  See Humphreys 1978: 228. 
54  See Ober 1998, and the fine analysis of Azoulay 2007. 
55  Azoulay 2007: 184 was perfectly right when he observed that: ‘‘la politique reste en effet 
l’horizon dans lequel s’inscrivent presque tous ces penseurs, y compris les plus marginaux’’.  
56  See Thomas 2006; Id. 2017. 
57  See Hornblower 2009: 63, who observes that the relation of Thucydides to the Socratic corpus, 
has not been much studied. However, the book of Desclos 2003 is an excellent study on the influence 
that the work of Thucydides had on Plato. On Thucydides and Isocrates see Nicolai 2004 and on 
Thucydides and Xenophon see Canfora 1970. 
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Conclusion
In the Athenian democracy the experts in public affairs did not have 
any autonomy of action and it was unthinkable that they could define the 
political principles of the community and maintain control of the institutions58. 
Indeed, the Athenian demos profoundly distrusted those who might have 
thought themselves irreplaceable. Thus, terms such as politike techne, politike 
episteme were excluded from the political terminology of the orators, who were 
perfectly aware of the fact that the demos was the sovereign of the city59. The 
Athenians citizens possessed the right not only to take an active part in political 
discussions, but also to make and follow the political decision which seemed 
to them the best. 
It is unnecessary to enumerate here the ‘‘experts’’ who were victims of 
political trials, accused of failing to appropriately perform the tasks which 
the sovereign civic body entrusted to them. Condemned to be deprived of 
their political rights, to pay heavy punitive fines levied by the popular courts, 
driven into exile or even executed, the “experts” knew perfectly well that 
political activity entails a great risk. Thus, in the Athenian democracy, even 
the man who was equipped with superior intellectual and ethical principles and 
excellent political knowledge, was subject to the control of the majority which 
dominated the institutions and more generally the public sphere.
More than any other Athenian intellectual of the late fifth century 
Thucydides was not only fully aware of this dimension of politics, but if we 
have to believe his own testimony he was its ‘‘victim’’. In this context, his 
decision to withdraw from active political life constituted also a personal 
response to what he considered as a highly questionable way of administrating 
the city. Undoubtedly it is very significant that the first systematic reflection 
on political art and knowledge and more precisely on the figure of the 
political expert, is operated by Thucydides: he presented Pericles as an ideal 
leader functioning within a political system which was a ‘‘democracy only 
in name’’60. In 2.65 Thucydides elaborates the idea that the Athenian political 
crisis appears in Athens when ‘‘the demos came to rule in fact as well as in 
name’’61 or more precisely after the death of the men who embodied the virtues 
of the real statesman. Here we can wonder to what extent the focalisation on 
the personality of an eminent leader, his representation as the core of a political 
system which collapses after his death was not influenced by the Socratic idea 
58  On the extremely problematic place of the political expert in the Athenian democracy see 
Bertrand 2001: 932-942 and the recent, stimulating study of Ismard 2015.  
59  Bertrand 2001: 930-940. 
60  Thuc. 2.65. We are not surprised by the fact that in the Athens of Thucydides’s Pericles, one 
of the pylons of democracy collapses: isegoria. See further Christodoulou 2013. On Thucydides’s 
description of the ability of Pericles to control the demos see Tsakmakis 2006. 
61  Ober 1998: 10; Christodoulou 2013: 246. 
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that in order to establish an ideal form of government, the personality of the 
excellent political expert is far more important than the institutions. 
The exact nature and characteristics of the audience of Thucydides can 
hardly be defined. However, we may formulate the hypotheses that he wrote 
for a well-educated reading audience able to appreciate the complexity and 
innovative approach of his narration. From Thucydides’s own standpoint the true 
nature of his work can thus be appreciated only by a very restricted audience, by 
those educated men who were quite familiar with a literature focused on politics, 
forensic speeches, science treatises, constitutions, ideal forms of government, 
and other politico-philosophical issues. It is very probable that it was within this 
‘‘microcosm of intellectuals’’, whose members were not exclusively Athenian, 
that the written text of Thucydides firstly circulated and became a valuable 
possession for Plato, Xenophon and Isocrates. It is also very probable that it is 
for the members of this community of intellectuals that the encomium of Pericles 
in 2.65 –which Thucydides wrote after the end of the war–, was composed. 
Following a particular intellectual trend of his time Thucydides tried, using the 
historical observation of Pericles’s personality, to participate in a contemporary 
ideological and political debate concerning the ideal leadership, a subject which 
profoundly concerned Socrates and his disciples. 
At the end of his work, Thucydides makes the much-discussed statement 
that during the first period of the new regime of the Five Thousand the Athenians 
appear to have had a better government than ever before, at least in his time62. 
As I have observed elsewhere, his testimony must be completely honest63. The 
way he has presented Pericles’s leadership and Pericles’s “democracy” to the 
reader does not constitute historical reality64. It is rather a theoretical reflection 
on the politeia, in particular a literary representation of the ideal relationship 
between the charismatic leader, the constitution and the citizens. Taking as his 
vantage point the action of an important historical figure, he represents in an 
extremely original manner an exceptional political expert.
I think that the peculiar, ahistorical and particular representation of Pericles 
by Thucydides is extremely relevant to a specific intellectual phenomenon: the 
development –mainly after the end of the Peloponnesian war– of the idea that 
formation of excellent political thought could be attained through the systematic 
study and representation of an ideal model of leadership.
The reflection on political expertise in the classical period flourishes 
within a community of intellectuals who profoundly believed that there was no 
place for them in public affairs. Situated at the margins of the civic community, 
62  Thuc. 8.97: ‘‘And during the first period the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best 
government they ever had, at least in my time” (καὶ οὐχ ἥκιστα δὴ τὸν πρῶτον χρόνον ἐπί γε ἐμοῦ 
Ἀθηναῖοι φαίνονται εὖ πολιτεύσαντες). 
63  Christodoulou 2013: 253-254. 
64  See also Will 2016: 70. 
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Plato, Isocrates and Xenophon elaborated major political projects based on the 
innovative and singular idea that political power must be the exclusive privilege 
of the man who perfectly masters the art of government. It is thus remarkable 
that this idea was systematically and dynamically developed in political 
treatises such as The Republic and the Statesman of Plato, the Cypriot Orations 
of Isocrates and the Cyropaedia and the Agesilaus of Xenophon, all composed 
during the first half of the 4th century BC, and more precisely, between the 
years 380 and 355. In these texts, the coexistence of power and knowledge are 
considered absolutely necessary for the advent of the perfect political expert 
who will break the infernal cycle of political instability. Certainly, there was 
no place for these men in the Athenian democracy65. This, I think, was the 
greatest lesson given to them by the way of life and the intellectual production 
of Thucydides the Athenian. 
65  For a more detailed analysis see Christodoulou (forthcoming). 
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